

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 147624
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

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-----078503 241910Z /46

P 241829Z JUN 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 147624

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:NATO, PFOR, PARM

SUBJECT: BRIEFING THE ALLIES ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN TALKS

RE: STATE 145482

FOR DIRECTOR WARNKE

1. FOLLOWING ARE SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS ON CTB FOR YOUR
JUNE 27 NAC BRIEFING. YOU WILL HAVE RECEIVED TEXT OF BRIEF
STATEMENT ON WASHINGTON BILATERALS WHICH WE HAVE PROVIDED
NATO POLADS (REFTEL).

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2. BEGIN TALKING POINTS. THE WASHINGTON EXPLORATORY TALKS
WERE WIDE RANGING AND TOUCHED ON THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

OBJECTIVES. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT A MULTILATERAL CTB
TREATY TO WHICH THERE WAS BROAD ADHERENCE COULD CONTRIBUTE
TO CURBING THE NUCLEAR ARMS COMPETITION AND ESPECIALLY TO
PREVENTING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION.

NEGOTIATING PROCESS. BOTH SIDES AGREED THAT THE MANNER OF PRESENTING THE RESULTS OF THE FUTURE TRILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WILL BE IMPORTANT IN GAINING MAXIMUM SUPPORT FOR THE TREATY. HOWEVER, AT THIS POINT, THE SOVIETS LEAN TOWARD NAILING DOWN MOST OF THE TREATY TEXT TRILATERALLY WHILE THE US WOULD PREFER TO NEGOTIATE ONLY THE "KEY ELEMENTS" TRILATERALLY

WHICH WOULD THEN BE SUBMITTED TO THE CCD AS THE BASIS FOR THE ELABORATION OF THE TREATY TEXT.

PNES. THE QUESTION OF PNES PRODUCED THE MOST CLEAR-CUT DIVERGENCE OF VIEWS. THE SOVIET SIDE ARGUED STRONGLY THAT PNES HAVE GREAT VALUE FOR THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND THAT A BAN ON PNES WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE V OF THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. THEY ARGUED THAT TECHNICAL MEANS COULD BE FOUND TO ENSURE THAT PNES WERE NOT USED TO GAIN MILITARY ADVANTAGES. THE US SIDE ARGUED AGAINST MAKING AN EXCEPTION FOR PNES, POINTING OUT THAT ARTICLE V DID NOT OBLIGE NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES TO PERFORM PNE SERVICES FOR OTHERS IF WE WERE NOT USING THEM OURSELVES, THAT A PNE EXCEPTION WOULD GIVE NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES A PRETEXT FOR PURSUING INDIGENOUS NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS, AND THAT SOME COUNTRIES MIGHT NOT JOIN WHAT THEY MIGHT REGARD AS A DISCRIMINATORY ARRANGEMENT PERMITTING ONLY NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES TO CONDUCT PNES. WE ALSO STRESSED THAT WE
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WERE UNAWARE OF ANY TECHNICAL MEANS WHICH COULD PREVENT THE ATTAINMENT OF MILITARY BENEFITS THROUGH PNES.

ADHERENCE AND DURATION. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THERE COULD BE A SUSPENSION OF TESTING WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES. HOWEVER, THERE WERE DIFFERENCES OF VIEW REGARDING THE DURATION OF THE COMMITMENT OF ANY STATE NOT TO TEST IF OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SUSPENSION. THE US PREFERRED A LONGER COMMITMENT THAN THE SOVIETS.

VERIFICATION. THE SUBJECT OF VERIFICATION WAS NOT DEALT WITH IN ANY GREAT DETAIL. THE SOVIETS SUPPORT THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA TO SUPPLEMENT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. THEY REITERATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO INCLUDE ON-SITE INSPECTION, PROVIDED THE INSPECTED STATE HAD THE RIGHT TO TURN DOWN A REQUEST FOR AN INSPECTION VISIT, AS INCORPORATED IN THE REVISED SOVIET DRAFT CTB TREATY.

OVERALL THE BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WERE A VERY USEFUL EXPLORATORY EXERCISE WHICH IDENTIFIED AREAS OF AGREEMENT AND SUGGESTED AREAS WHERE ACCOMMODATION MIGHT BE REACHED. THE

MOST DIFFICULT QUESTION TO DEAL WITH WILL BE PNES, ALTHOUGH
REMAINING DIFFERENCES ON VERIFICATION AND DURATION MAY ALSO
PROVE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE. END TALKING POINTS.
CHRISTOPHER

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NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY, INSTRUCTIONS, NUCLEAR TESTS, BRIEFINGS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 24-Jun-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 22 May 2009
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Enclosure: n/a
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Expiration:
Film Number: D770227-0074
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From: STATE
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Line Count: 120
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Subject: BRIEFING THE ALLIES ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN TALKS RE: STATE 145482 FOR DIRECTOR WARNKE
TAGS: PFOR, PARM, NATO
To: MOSCOW
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vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/efd7e76-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
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